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This paper analyses the current security challenges and military balance in the
Black Sea region. The region, which has been going through vast political and
economic transformations since the end of the Cold War, has become a platform
for great power rivalry in the last few years. NATO expansion and Russian
resistance to it, combined with the existing protracted conflicts, resulted in the first
major regional war in a decade. The Russia–Georgia war of 2008 proved that
regional actors still perceive the use of force as an acceptable tool of foreign
policy. The changing military balance and abrupt increases in military expenditure
from some actors suggest that the likelihood of other interstate conflicts in the
region is high. Providing security and stability in the Black Sea seems more
difficult than the pre-August 2008 war period.
Keywords: Black Sea; European Union; military balance; NATO; Russia;
security; Turkey; United States
Introduction
The Black Sea region is at the forefront of the global strategic agenda in the first
decade of the twenty-first century, especially after the growing Euro-Atlantic interest
in the region followed by the Russia–Georgia war in August 2008. The region has
undergone political, social and economical transitions simultaneously since the end of
the Cold War. The rapid political developments that took place in the eastern and
western shores of the basin require new approaches and patterns to analyse the new
security context in the region. Romania’s and Bulgaria’s NATO and European Union
(EU) memberships, Turkey’s start of accession talks with the EU, the coloured revo-
lutions in Ukraine and Georgia and these countries’ bid for NATO membership,
Russia’s new assertive foreign policy and the Russia–Georgia war over South Ossetia
are some indicators of the Euro-Atlantic inclinations and Russia’s reactions against
such an integration into western institutions.
Paradoxically, the Cold War provided some degree of stability and security to the
Black Sea region. Contrary to the other ‘fronts’ in Europe, the Middle East or Asia,
the Black Sea region did not witness any military confrontation between the super-
powers or their proxies. Surrounded by the Soviets and its allies, Turkey as a NATO
member managed to preserve the Alliance’s interests without provoking any Russian
military reaction in the region. To the surprise of many, about two decades since the
end of the Cold War, such stability appears to belong only to the days of superpower































342  Ö. Özdamar
emergence of independent states with serious security challenges (Ukraine, Georgia,
Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan), growing transatlantic involvement by the EU and
the NATO and Russia’s increasing threat perceptions, destabilizing and unresolved
regional conflicts (Abkhazia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Ajaria, South Ossetia,
Chechnya), first declining then increasing Russian influence, a strategic role for west-
ern energy security, two ‘coloured’ revolutions (Ukraine and Georgia), the Russia–
Georgia war and various democratization problems and domestic political challenges.
In less than two decades, the countries of the Black Sea region went through a difficult
period of transformation that increased risks to various forms of security in the region.
This article includes a discussion of current security issues in the region and the inter-
ests of major actors. A quantitative assessment of military expenditure and force
strengths of Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) members in relation to possible
future interstate conflicts in the region follows. The unit of analysis throughout this
article is the member states of the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation,
i.e. Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania,
Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine. The BSEC member states are preferred as unit of
analysis over the Black Sea littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey
and Ukraine) due to the BSEC’s status as the most effective regional organization and
the pioneer of regionalization in the Black Sea. Due to the growing involvement of the
EU and the USA in regional politics and security matters of the Black Sea region, their
positions regarding various issues are also discussed.
Major actors and their security interests in the Black Sea region
The two events that shaped the current security dynamics of the region are the collapse
of the Soviet Union followed by the emergence of new actors in 1991, and the terrorist
attacks of 9/11 that resulted in heightened American strategic interests in the region
for control of Afghanistan, Central Asia and the so-called greater Middle East. The
end of the Cold War made the Black Sea region open to external influences for the
first time. The increasing American influence and resistance to it make the Black Sea
a stage of great power politics for the first time in modern history.
Complex relations and interests in the region can be simplified if major power
centres that perceive important stakes in the Black Sea are defined. There are four
major power blocs with varying degrees of influence that push and pull security policy
options within the region. These are Russia and its so-called ‘near abroad’ policy, the
EU and its Black Sea littoral member states (Bulgaria and Romania), the USA and its
recently increased efforts to penetrate into the region militarily and Turkey maintain-
ing a status quo position on various issues while promoting economic and security
cooperation within the region. The complex relations among these four major centres
of influence will shape the future of security arrangements and stability in the Black
Sea region.
Russian military and political superiority was challenged with the end of the Cold
War. Realizing the difficulties of maintaining global political influence and an arms
race with the USA with a fragile economy, Russia chose to limit its sphere of
influence to what it calls the ‘near abroad’. The near abroad, as defined by Russian
opinion-makers, includes all the non-Russian ex-Soviet republics in the region where
Russia aims to maintain its own political influence (Tsygankov 2006). More specifi-
cally, Russia focuses its foreign policy on the South Caucasus, Ukraine and Moldova
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differs greatly. There are the so-called integrationists (or reformers), such as former
President Yeltsin’s minister of foreign affairs Andrey Kozyrev who supported integra-
tion with the west and a non-interventionist policy in the near abroad, warning that the
days of great Russian influence or expansion was over. The second group, which is
usually called the balancers (or the Eurasianists), favours a rather limited yet strong
Russian influence on issues such as counterbalancing the western powers, military
installations in the post-Soviet space, containment of political Islam and border prob-
lems in the region. The third group, on the other hand, is called the neo-imperialists
and is represented by Russian nationalists such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady
Zyuganov. This group favours a more aggressive foreign policy: bringing balance
back to global politics by maintaining strong Russian influence in the region, whether
to the extent of re-building the Russian empire or strengthening closer relations with
Slavic countries in the Black Sea, Baltic and Balkan regions. Naturally, the policy
recommendations of neo-imperialists evoked the strongest criticism from most of the
ex-Soviet republics and the western powers (Tsygankov 2006). For many western
analysts, the near abroad policy is nothing more than another attempt to re-establish
Russian imperial control in the post-Soviet space and perceived as the main obstacle
to the political and economic development of these nations.
More specifically, the events of the last few years strengthened suspicions about
Russian aims in the Black Sea region. Russia’s involvement in Ukrainian and
Georgian domestic politics, its support for the stalemate on unresolved conflicts in the
South Caucasus, the use of natural gas as a bargaining chip against the EU, Ukraine
and Georgia, and a speech by the President Putin at the Munich Security Conference
in February 2007 where he pictured NATO’s expansion in Europe as representing ‘a
serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust [between NATO and
Russia]’ were some of the incidents that added to doubts about Russian influence in
the region (Putin 2007). The Russia–Georgia war of 2008 has only exacerbated appre-
hension about how Russia will use its influence over smaller powers in the region.
To understand the Russian perspective on regional matters, the 2005 remarks by
Gleb Pavlovsky, a Kremlin political consultant, on the near abroad policy are useful.
Pavlovsky summarized the new Russian near abroad policy with three major points:
(1) regime stability in the Commonwealth of Independent States countries is the most
important issue for Russia regardless of other concerns and the model for Russia is
Belarus in this context; (2) Russia reserves its right to cooperate with the entire polit-
ical spectrum of neighbouring countries, including both government and opposition,
non-governmental organizations, democratic organizations and in-system political
groups to promote Russian interests in the post-Soviet space; and (3) Russia still
perceives the transatlantic institutions as a threat to its interests both in and out of the
region, and it will continue building up its global influence (Socor 2005). All these
factors have an implication for Russian foreign policy in the Black Sea: simply put,
Russia perceives the transatlantic penetration in the region as a threat to its interests.
As such, Russia does and will oppose any further NATO-oriented security instalments
in and around the Black Sea.
The second important actor with a stake in the politics of the region is the EU.
With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Union in January 2007, the EU has
become an important actor in the Black Sea context. The EU aims to increase its pres-
ence and influence in the Black Sea through its regional programmes – the European
Neighbourhood Policy and the Black Sea Synergy. With the German presidency in
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EU has two major interests along with many other minor ones in the region. First, the
EU aims to secure energy supplies from the region to its markets. European depen-
dency on Russian energy creates a vital need for transiting gas and oil to the EU
markets through the Black Sea and Turkey. Second, many policy-makers are
convinced that the stabilization and democratization of the ex-Soviet republics in the
region will strengthen the security of Europe. Many experts see the fragile republics
in the region as sources of instability, conflict and terrorism that have the potential to
affect the EU’s security (Aydin 2005). Therefore, the EU aims to support democrati-
sation, good governance projects and civil society within these countries (Aydin
2004). These policies of the EU and its support for the Orange and Rose revolutions
in Ukraine and Georgia provoked a number of reactions from Russian politicians.
The third power that has increasing strategic interests in the region is the USA.
Observing the delicate balances of the Cold War, the USA and the NATO did not have
any active role in the Black Sea region. In fact, even in the first decade of the post-
Cold War era, the USA maintained a rather low profile when Black Sea issues were
considered. However, with the events of 9/11, transatlantic security focus shifted from
Central and Eastern Europe to what is called ‘greater Middle East’ and ‘wider Black
Sea’. The USA’s interests in the region can be summarized as follows. First, American
policy-makers argue that the original impetus for the current debate on American
involvement in the region came from Europeans, specifically Bulgaria and Romania.
According to this point of view, EU and NATO enlargement should not stop at the
western shore of the Black Sea, it should instead spread over to the eastern parts of the
region. Drawing analogies from the period immediately after Second World War in
Western Europe, and the post-Cold War period in Central and Eastern Europe, the
advocates of this view propose that peace and stability can be achieved in other parts
of the region as well. The coloured revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, in particular,
strengthened this line of thinking and raised hope for similar democratisation in other
parts of the region (Asmus 2006).
Second, the USA recognizes the region as a strategic asset for the control of the
so-called ‘greater Middle East’. To increase its influence over the region and facilitate
the war on terrorism, the USA’s new security perceptions require control over the
wider Black Sea with its strategic position between Europe and the Middle East. These
aims, of course, can only be achieved via an increased political and military presence
in the region. The USA already attempted to extend the Operation Active Endeavour
to the Black Sea.1 However, Turkey proposed that Black Sea Harmony operated by
Turkish Navy is already committed to the same purposes in the region.2
The third major reason that the USA has shifted its attention to the region is energy
security. For the USA, minimising the western markets’ energy dependency on
Russian energy is of great importance. Therefore, the USA aims to diminish the
Russian role as major energy supplier to the markets. Thus, the Black Sea becomes
vital as the key transit region for natural gas and, to some extent, oil. Though American
involvement in the Black Sea is new, it could potentially become more influential and
draw a greater reaction from Russia.
The fourth actor that has an important influence over the future of the Black Sea
security issues is Turkey. Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has championed
regional cooperation schemes, both on economic and security matters. However, with
the changing security environment after 9/11, Turkey’s uneasy relations with the USA
regarding Iraq and growing tensions between Russia and the EU–NATO couple led
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prevent existing regional initiatives (e.g. BSEC, Black Sea naval task force [BLACK-
SEAFOR] and Black Sea Harmony) from being harmed by the new rivalry between
the west and Russia, Turkey has chosen to defend the status quo in the region.
The concerns of Turkish policy-makers about emerging tensions between the trans-
atlantic actors and Russia are twofold. First and foremost, Turkey’s concerns focus on
the maritime security domain. Maritime security in the region is largely shaped by the
Montreux Convention of 1936 that governs the regime of the Turkish Straits (Bosporus
and Dardanelles). This sui generis treaty recognizes the sovereignty of Turkey over the
two straits, allows for free passage of commercial ships and limits the stay of military
ships from non-littoral states to 21 days in the Black Sea. This agreement had the
support of all the littoral states because it limited the military activities of non-littoral
states in the region. During the Cold War, the USA and the NATO also favoured
the agreement because it limited the ability of the Soviet Navy to shift forces to the
Mediterranean over a short period of time, due to the limitations on the number of
warships that can pass the straits in a certain time. However, with the changing security
dynamics, Bulgaria and Romania brought up the possibility of relaxing the terms
of Montreux, in favour of a large US Navy presence in the Black Sea. Of course,
American policy-makers also support such a plan. These suggestions are strongly
opposed by Turkey for one major reason: Turkey fears this can change the balance of
power in the region and make Russia feel even more contained, thereby destabilising
the region even further. As a result, more than seven decades of peace and stability in
the maritime security of the Black Sea might be threatened. The Turkish position on
expanding the NATO forces to the Black Sea is that Turkey as a NATO member is in
favour of maintaining maritime security activities in cooperation with both NATO and
the littoral states. For Turkey, a change in the status quo might be more costly than
beneficial for all actors in the region.
Secondly, Turkish policy-makers suggest that any security arrangement in the
region must be agreed upon by all littoral states to maintain the balance in the region
and prevent further threats to the already volatile regional politics. Of course, this
position is mostly related (but not limited) to Russian concerns. Turkey aims to
include every littoral state in each security arrangement. What Turkey emphasises
most is that Russia must be incorporated into security arrangements in order to protect
the fragile balance and prevent more assertive Russian foreign policies.
Therefore, Turkey initiated a BLACKSEAFOR in 1998 to reinforce regional secu-
rity arrangements. BLACKSEAFOR was formally established in April 2001 to
perform search and rescues operations, humanitarian assistance, mine counter-
measures and environmental protection (Simon 2006). To improve the on-call assis-
tance mechanism of BLACKSEAFOR and meet new asymmetric threats, Turkey
began executing a new security initiative called Black Sea Harmony in March 2004.
The aim of this initiative is similar to NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour in the
Mediterranean Sea (Karadeniz 2007). Turkey continues its multilateral approach to
Black Sea security and invited other littoral states to participate. After Russia, Ukraine
is also likely to join the initiative. This brief discussion on the interests of major
powers helps assess the military balance and security threats regarding the region.
The military balance in the Black Sea
In this section, a quantitative comparison of military expenditure trends and force
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military expenditure and its percentage of GDP, along with a manpower and equip-
ment comparison of navies, armies and air forces of the 12 countries. Such an analysis
is useful because it examines measurable facts, instead of the ‘intentions’ or ‘strate-
gies’ (Cordesman 2004) of actors that some analysts assume.3
During the Cold War, the military balance in the Black Sea region favoured the
Soviet Union and the countries within its sphere of influence. In the west, east and
north of the Black Sea, the Soviet Union, Romania and Bulgaria were the Warsaw
Pact powers while the NATO member, Turkey, guarded the southern flank of the
western alliance. Owing to its rather ‘closed’ nature to outside influences and
the Montreux Convention that limits the access of foreign navies to the Black Sea, the
region enjoyed stability despite the obvious superiority of the Soviet naval forces.
However, with the downfall of the USSR, the balance shifted to the detriment of
Russian interests. Especially during the 1990s, due to economic difficulties and the
loss of its influence on other littoral states (e.g. Ukraine), Russian military superiority
was diminished, if not totally challenged. In this section, the material capabilities of
the six littoral states, the military balance and the expenditures of the 12 BSEC
member states are discussed.
One of the methods to compare the material ‘power’ of states concerning security
and military issues is to measure their relative material capabilities. Despite the rela-
tive decrease compared to the Cold War years, it would be a mistake to underestimate
Russian capabilities in this respect. Figure 1 shows the national capabilities distribu-
tion of the littoral states in 2001, the latest available year in the data-set. That is, this
figure shows the percentage share of each littoral state’s ‘material capabilities’
(Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972) within the Black Sea region.4 Even such a simple
analysis illustrates the importance of Russian influence in the region. About 60% of
Figure 1. A comparison of national capabilities of Black Sea littoral states 2004 (Singer,
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total capabilities belong to Russia while Ukraine and Turkey each posses less than
one-third of Russian capabilities each.
Figure 1. A comparison of national capabilities of Black Sea littoral states 2004 (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).Material capabilities are not identical to power. To analyse capabilities is not to
deny the influence of other factors providing security such as multilateral security
institutions. Still, this analysis is useful because it gives an idea as to why there is such
a strong Russian influence in the region. If power can be defined as a nation’s ability
to exert and resist influence, understanding the material indicators that lie behind such
influence is of utmost importance to understanding the regional dynamics.
Another way to analyse the nature of balance of power in the region is by studying
military spending trends. Usually, abrupt increases in military expenditure in a dyad
of states can be an early indicator of military confrontation. In some cases, slow but
steady increases in military spending of two or more countries give a similar warning.
Therefore, an analysis of military sizes and expenditure of regional powers may help
conflict prevention. Figure 2 shows estimates of military expenditure by each BSEC
member states in the period from 1998 to 2007 based on data provided by SIPRI
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2009). Evidently, Russia leads
military expenditure in the region with a little over US$35 billion (in constant 2005
dollars) in 2007. Russia is followed by Turkey (US$11 billion) and Greece (US$9
billion). This shows an important aspect of military balance in the region: Russia and
Turkey maintain the largest military capabilities in the region. An interesting trend in
Figure 2 is that Russian military spending has been increasing steadily over the last
decade. Towards the end of the Cold War, Russia maintained an unsustainable mili-
tary expenditure which was US$218 billion per year in 1988 equalling approximately
16% of its GDP (SIPRI 2009). For many analysts, this tremendous military spending
led to poverty and was the main reason that the people of the Soviet Union toppled the
communist regime. With the end of the Cold War, Russian military spending signifi-
cantly plummeted. In 1998, Russian military spending was as low as US$13 billion
per year. As gas and oil revenues grew, Russian military spending picked up.
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Compared to the Cold War era, Russian expenditure is still low considering the size
of its armed forces. However, the trend shows a steady increase reflecting Russian
aspirations to strengthened military power. After such a steady increase, one can theo-
retically expect more use of force from Russia. Sudden jumps in military spending are
also to be observed carefully. Georgian military spending increased from US$58
million in 2002 to US$592 million in 2007, in only five years (SIPRI 2009). The
Military Balance (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2009) predicted that
Georgian military expenditure was around US$1.1 billion in 2008, 20 times more than
just a decade ago. The events of August 2008 are an example of the relationship
between higher military spending and imminent military conflict.
Figure 2. Military expenditure in BSEC members 1998–2007 (SIPRI 2009).Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the region is given in Figure 3
(SIPRI 2009). This analysis shows the percentage of the national income that policy-
makers are willing to spend on defence. Usually, in less militarized states, one can
expect this figure to range from 2% to 4%. Figure 3 shows similar trends in terms of
military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Russia, Turkey and Greece spend about
4–5% of their GDP on the military. When longer term trends are observed, one can
see that the military spending of the Black Sea countries has been quite stable in the
last decade, from 1% to 5% of their GDPs. Relatively constant nature of spending
behaviour suggests there is no region-wide arms race. However, there are two excep-
tions to this. The military spending of Georgia and Azerbaijan show steep increases,
both in terms of absolute measures and relative to their GDPs. In 2000, Georgia spent
about half a percent of its GDP on defence. Since then there has been a steady increase
and an abrupt jump after 2004. In 2005, Georgia’s military expenditure jumped from
1.4% to 3.3% of the GDP, and in 2006 to a record 5.2%. Azerbaijan’s increase in
spending as a size of GDP seems less rapid. However, one should consider that with
higher oil prices, Azerbaijan’s GDP increased very rapidly as well. Azeri GDP grew
from 27 to 40 billion US dollars from 2007 to 2008 (International Institute for
Strategic Studies 2009). Therefore, even though the percentage of GDP spending
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shows a normal progress, in absolute measures, from 2004 to 2007 Azerbaijan’s
defence spending jumped from 260 to 667 million US dollars (SIPRI 2009). In 2008,
Azerbaijan’s defence budget was estimated to be a record US$1258 million by The
Military Balance (2009). Such increases in military spending boosted the confidence
of some hawks in Georgia that it could prevail in a military confrontation against
Russia (International Crisis Group 2008a). In fact, the August 2008 war had disastrous
consequences for the country. Therefore, the international community should take
unusual increases in military spending in the Black Sea region as an early warning for
military confrontation, especially with regard to Azerbaijan and Armenia in the near
future.
Figure 3. Military expenditure as share of GDP 1997–2006 (SIPRI 2009).Lastly, a brief comparison of the military sizes of the regional actors will be
presented. Table 1 shows the military personnel capacities of the 12 BSEC member
states (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2009). Russia’s vast army, with an
enormous reserve capacity of some 20 million, dominates the regional balance of
power. This perhaps explains why other smaller powers aim to balance the Russian
effect in the region with a USA–NATO presence. The second largest personnel capac-
ity is the Turkish armed forces with more than half a million active and 378,700 on
reserves. The other significant forces in the region are Ukraine and Greece, although
they are lagging far behind the first two. Finally, Figure 4 illustrates total military
spending of the BSEC member states in comparison with the other regions in the
world. The figure shows that even with the inclusion of substantial Russian spending,
the Black Sea is not a highly militarized region compared to others such as the Middle
East.
Figure 4. Military expenditure by some world regions in 2007 (SIPRI 2009).Tables 2, 3 and 4 compare navies, armies and air forces in the region by military
equipment (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2009), respectively. A similar
balance can be observed in these categories as well. Russia and Turkey maintain the
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leading armed forces in the region in terms of military equipment type and quality.
The naval forces of the littoral states are depicted in Table 2. The Russian Navy is by
far the strongest. However, when Russian forces are reviewed, one must consider the
vast size of Russia and how these forces are dispersed over the largest land mass in
the world. Therefore, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is included as a separate column in the
table. When such a comparison is made, the Turkish Navy and armed forces seem to
have a similar conventional capacity to that of Russia.5
All things considered, military security in the Black Sea can be provided by a few
forces: Russia, Turkey and to some degree Ukraine and Greece. Perhaps this also
explains why Turkey has been willing to incorporate Russia – and Ukraine – in every
regional security-building initiative. This review shows that the provision of security
in the region is more likely to work if it is multilateral and non-exclusive. Therefore,
admitting Georgia and Ukraine to NATO without agreeing with Russia may prove
even more problematic than some analysts suggest. Also, this review shows that some
states in the region have begun to perceive engagement in militarized conflict as a
means to resolve problems; this is likely to cause interstate wars, as it did between
Georgia and Russia. Such states and their military expenditure, and the nature of such
spending, must be closely observed.
The Russia–Georgia war and other potential interstate armed conflicts 
in the region
Early in the morning of 8 August 2008, the Georgian army began a large-scale attack
on the break-away region of South Ossetia. Almost instantly, Russian troops started a
counterattack against Georgian troops in the region, conducting air raids further in the
country, and the Russian Navy blockaded the Georgian Black Sea coast. On 12
August, Russian-backed militia in Abkhazia attacked the Kodori Gorge held by
Georgian troops and advanced into Georgia. On 15 August, Georgia signed an EU-
brokered ceasefire agreement with Russia. In about a week-long conflict, Georgia was
totally expelled from South Ossetia and Abkhazia and suffered losses in territories
controlled by Tbilisi (BBC News 2008). On 26 August 2008, Russia recognised the
independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which was followed by the Georgian
government’s announcement that these regions are ‘territories occupied by Russia’
(Civil Georgia 2008).
With the August war, Russia engaged in its first conventional use of force since
the Cold War and established new protectorates. Russia’s response to Georgia’s
attacks was condemned and called ‘disproportionate’ by the USA and the EU. Russia
argues that the operations were meant to protect its own citizens in these regions, yet
this argument has not convinced the various actors in the region. On the contrary,
many perceive this conflict as a sign of a more assertive, if not aggressive, Russian
foreign policy and Russia’s ambition end transatlantic penetration into the ex-USSR
space.
The August war has major implications for the security and stability in the
Caucasus and the Black Sea region. It was the first major interstate conflict since the
Nagorno-Karabakh war that ended in 1994 and the first major armed conflict in a
decade since the second Chechen war. Implications of this conflict can be analysed at
three levels. First, from the perspective of Georgia and other consolidating democra-
cies, the war was a major blow to those aiming to integrate into transatlantic political
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and hopes to pursue democratization and liberal economic reforms under the protec-
tion of the USA and the EU were curbed. The August war sent a strong message to
smaller powers in the region that consider western models of political and economic
change in their countries. According to this point of view, Georgia was actually pena-
lised by Russia for its NATO membership aspirations, liberal reforms and close rela-
tions with the USA and the EU, not for attacking Tskhinvali. Georgian President
Saakashvili’s power to transform his country was seriously damaged and prospects for
reform look dimmer than ever. In countries such as Ukraine, policy-makers feel even
more constrained by Russia’s possible response to their NATO or EU bids.
At the regional level, the Russia–Georgia war proved that interstate war is still on
the table as a policy option. That is, Russia showed it will not hesitate to use over-
whelming force when its interests are at stake. History shows that once use of force is
‘normalized’ as a tool of foreign policy-making in a region, other actors also tend to
resort to it. Therefore, with or without Russian involvement, engaging in armed
conflict between states is more likely than before in the region. This is especially true
if there is a lack of hegemonic powers preventing conflicts. In the Black Sea, Russia
as the hegemonic power showed a willingness to use force as a means of settling
disputes. Therefore, although it is early to comment, this war may have destabilised
the wider Black Sea region beyond first estimates. Russia also hinted that it will only
allow limited sovereignty for ex-Soviet republics in the region, especially on security-
related matters (International Crisis Group 2008b). Some analysts argue that policy-
makers in Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Moldova already fear such Russian
interventionism (Nichol 2008). Although Russia has no legal right to intervene in the
foreign policy-making of sovereign states, it will do so in the future, especially on
issues like NATO membership. Another bleak implication of the war for states like
Georgia or Ukraine is that they cannot rely on western powers for their countries’
defence.
In terms of global politics, the war showed the limits of the transatlantic sphere of
influence. It appears that Russia is determined to develop policies against the so-called
transatlantic push beyond Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, NATO member-
ship prospects for Ukraine and Georgia look more problematic than ever. NATO
declared during the Bucharest summit in 2008 that these countries will become
members. Some NATO members are against this prospect in the near future; impor-
tant member states such as Germany, France and Italy opposed the idea of initiating
Membership Action Plans for the two Black Sea littoral states. It seems that many
important European actors, especially those with local commercial interests, are not
willing to challenge Russia ‘head on’ in the region (Triantaphyllou 2008). This indi-
cates yet another transatlantic divide over security policy. Due to higher volumes of
trade with and energy dependency on Russia, major EU powers were opposed to the
membership of Ukraine and Georgia. After the war, admitting Georgia to the Alliance
seems like a bigger liability for NATO than before since its two regions are under
Russian control.
The war also reconfirmed the sceptics’ view regarding the United Nations’ (UN)
capabilities to stop wars when the interests of one of the five permanent members of
the UN Security Council are at stake (International Crisis Group 2008b). The EU was
able to provide a more dynamic source of diplomacy during the war than the UN. On
the other hand, the August war may herald the end of the unipolar world in terms of
the systemic structure in international relations. Two decades of unipolarity in the
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Russia’s use of force seems to confirm the neorealist prediction that we will observe
more balancing behaviour from great powers like Russia and China against the USA
in the near future. It is too early to say whether the Russia–Georgia war was the break-
ing-point signalling the dawn of the second Cold War or a different systemic structure
such as bipolarity or multipolarity. But surely it is the first act of balancing by Russia
that involved the use of force since the end of the Cold War. As early as a decade ago,
neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz predicted such balancing behaviour due to NATO
expansionism: 
The reasons for expanding NATO are weak. The reasons for opposing expansion are
strong. It draws new lines of division in Europe, alienates those left out, and can find no
logical stopping place west of Russia. It weakens those Russians most inclined toward
liberal democracy and a market economy. It strengthens Russians of the opposite incli-
nation. It reduces hope for further large reductions of nuclear weaponry. It pushes
Russia toward China instead of drawing Russia toward Europe and America … In June
of 1998, Zbigniew Brzezinski went to Kiev with the message that Ukraine should
prepare itself to join NATO by the year 2010. The farther NATO intrudes into the
Soviet Union’s old arena, the more Russia is forced to look to the east rather than to the
west. (Waltz 2000, 22)
The USA’s and the EU’s reaction to Russia’s intervention were quite weak,
limited to some ‘strong’ rhetoric. There were discussions about a number of possible
sanctions against Russia immediately after the war, but EU and US decision-makers
did not seem to reach a firm conclusion (Nichol 2008). These sanctions were down-
played by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and never applied by the USA and
the EU as of December 2009. However, the sudden drop in the Russian stock market,
foreign currency, foreign investment and increase in domestic bond yield during and
after the war shows that Russian political decisions influence its economic and finan-
cial stability (International Crisis Group 2008b). Such instability could lead to domes-
tic criticism for the Russian administration’s aggressive foreign policy.
The future holds the serious risk for more conflicts in the region. Russia’s strong
conviction to defend its interests thorough the use of force could result in more inter-
state militarised conflicts in the region. One of greatest risks lies in another war
between Russia and Georgia. Both countries seem to hold on to their hardliner posi-
tions regarding the South Ossetia and Abkhazia issues. Considering that the level of
tension between the two countries is still quite high, any military exchange around the
demarcation line may lead to another deadly conflict. Military build-up from Russia
and Georgia at the border of Abkhazia during 2008 had already been worrying inter-
national analysts about a possible conflict in the region (International Crisis Group
2008a). Instead, it was the military build-up in and around South Ossetia that sparked
a conflict. Of course the Georgian side will consider future actions more carefully
after the clear defeat and loss of substantial military capacities to Russian forces. Yet,
in the mid-run, conflict between Russia and Georgia is still a great risk for the Black
Sea region.
Relations between Russia and Ukraine also pose a security risk in the Black Sea.
In fact, Russia’s relations with Ukraine have been as problematic as its relations with
Georgia. The Russian reaction to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine has been to
threaten and bully, in both political and economic spheres. Russian influence over
democratic politics in Ukraine should be observed carefully. Perhaps the biggest
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Ukraine’s membership to NATO is perceived as a direct threat and that it will be
forced to react. Moreover, Russia can mobilize the Russian-speaking minority in
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine against the government in Kyiv. An International Crisis
Group publication quoting a Russian newspaper, Kommersant, claimed that Vladimir
Putin told US President George W. Bush in the Bucharest NATO meeting in 2008,
‘You understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state! What is Ukraine? Part of
its territory is Eastern Europe, and another part, a significant one, was donated by us!’
The paper also claimed that during the same conference Putin hinted that if Ukraine
is admitted to NATO, it ‘can simply cease to exist’ (International Crisis Group
2008b, 17). We can expect relations to worsen if Ukraine does not extend the lease of
Russian Navy base in Sevastopol, which will end in 2017. The victory of Viktor
Yanukovych in the Ukranian presidential elections of early 2010, coupled with the
deal to extend the lease for the Russian Navy base in Sevastopol for another 25 years
and a lagging interest in NATO membership, implies that over the short- to mid-term
a number of possible conflicts between Russia and Ukraine have been averted.
Nevertheless, Ukraine’s neighbour Moldova can also face Russian military interven-
tion due to risks involved in the Transnistria conflict.
Finally, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan poses a
great threat to the stability of the region. The last few years in particular have
witnessed a huge military build-up on both sides, especially Azerbaijan. Figure 5
shows the comparative military expenditure between two countries since 1997. In
1997, the military expenditure of two countries was about the same. Since then, there
has been a gradual and substantial capacity-building for Azerbaijan that more than
tripled Armenia’s annual expenditure by 2007. From 2002 to 2007, Armenia doubled
its defence budget while Azerbaijan’s has more than tripled. Both countries seem to
be in an arms race led by Azerbaijan, thanks to revenues from its rich fossil fuel
reserves. Such a military build-up does not bode well for Armenian–Azeri relations,
the resolution of the conflict through peaceful means and the stability of the region.
Such abrupt increases in military expenditure are usually indicative of plans for
Figure 5. Comparison of military expenditure: Armenia and Azerbaijan (International
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military engagement with rivals. Azeri President Aliyev’s speech before a meeting
between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh in November 2009 is illus-
trative: ‘If this meeting ends without a result then our hopes in the negotiating process
will be exhausted in which case we will not have any other choice. We have the full
right to liberate our lands by military means’ (Olson 2009). In the same speech
President Aliyev also added, ‘We have strengthened our armed forces with billions
of dollars investments over years in case there will be no diplomatic solution with
Armenians’ (Hacio[gbrev]˘ lu 2009). In such a militarized conflict, Azerbaijan might prove
superior to Armenian capabilities. However, Armenia will probably be supported by
Russian troops in the region which would have spillover effects for the stability in the
whole region. Such a conflict with Russian involvement would only make the desta-
bilized region even more insecure.
Figure 5. Comparison of military expenditure: Armenia and Azerbaijan (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2009).To sum up, the August 2008 war has had enormous implications for the future of
security in the Black Sea region. Russian influence, which already overwhelmed
regional powers, is even greater than before. The war also strengthened the perception
that military confrontation is still a ‘normal’ policy to settle disputes. The further
destabilization of the region is thus possible if the regional actors accept the use of
force as a means to settle disputes.
Conclusion
After two decades of political and economic transition, the Black Sea region seems as
unstable and insecure as before. In fact, the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ proved to be
‘not frozen’ and pose the risk of turning into both interstate and intrastate wars. The
ambitions of the USA–EU couple to integrate the region to transatlantic institutions
and Russia’s strong resistance to such efforts have made the region a playground for
great power politics. Instead of advancing ‘a culture of concrete cooperation’, the
region seems to slide into the ‘geopolitical/geostrategic’ approach (Triantaphyllou
2007). Under such circumstances, historical grievances and unresolved conflicts are
likely to spark more violent conflicts. The military balance in the region clearly
favours Russia, despite a decline in the quality of its armed forces. Smaller powers, on
the other hand, perceive the use of force as a tool to resolve conflicts between and
within states. Such a perception is strengthened by the Russian–Georgian war of 2008
as well as the ineffectiveness of international institutions in resolving the regional
conflicts. Further interstate conflicts are likely in the region due to the protracted
nature of conflicts, assertive Russian foreign policy involving the use of force, the lack
of effective assistance from international and transatlantic institutions for conflict
resolution and the militarization of some regional actors as reflected in higher defence
budgets. Since the end of the Cold War, providing security in the Black Sea region
seems more difficult than ever before.
The analysis of the military balance in the region recommends some policy
prescriptions to decision-makers. First, military expenditure and activities should be
monitored with caution, particularly those of the actors involved in unresolved
conflicts. Steady increases in military spending may represent plans to resolve
conflicts using force. Also, minor skirmishes at borders in conflict zones should be
watched with care and must be ended as quickly as possible. These minor battles may
create spillover effects that can turn into larger armed conflicts. More specifically, the
armaments by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and its breakaway regions and border
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policies must be carefully considered regarding security issues and unresolved
conflicts in the region. Russia has stake in every unresolved conflict in the region and
appears to defend these interests more ambitiously than a decade ago. Policies that
will antagonize Russia are more likely to fail than succeed. Plans for NATO expansion
to Ukraine and Georgia need to be downgraded. The most efficient way to deal with
Russia may be through joint policy-making in international organisations such as the
BSEC and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Third,
international organizations must be provided with more resources to help resolve
regional conflicts and prevent militarization. To that aim, national governments that
have interests in the region should choose to support multilateral policy-making
through intergovernmental organizations. For example, the support for the OSCE
Minsk Group from France, Russia and the USA is an example of such efforts. Finally,
further regionalization efforts should be developed in order to create and maintain a
culture of cooperation in the region. Economic and trade policy cooperation at the
BSEC platform should be advanced to create multilayered interdependencies among
regional actors. Such dependencies will naturally help to resolve conflicts over the
long-run and advance security sector cooperation in the Black Sea region.
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Notes
1. Operation Active Endeavour was initiated in October 2001 as NATO’s immediate response
to the 9/11 attacks. Currently, from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Strait of Gibraltar,
NATO ships are patrolling, monitoring shipping and providing escorts to non-military
vessels against terrorist activities. More than 75,000 ships were monitored and 100 boarded
in the operation so far.
2. Turkey sees Black Sea Harmony in affiliation with the NATO’s Active Endeavour and
provides the NATO headquarters in Naples with the information gathered from the initiative.
3. Quantitative comparisons are useful; however, readers should be aware of its limitations
too. First, data from different sources often conflict with each other. Therefore, SIPRI and
Military Balance data-sets that are generally considered objective sources are used.
Second, many aspects of military balance such as force quality cannot be qualified. Third,
due to space constraints, this analysis only focuses on interstate military balance. Non-state
actors and their influences cannot be included. Fourth, more detailed analyses of military
spending lead to safer conclusions (Cordesman 2004). For example, breaking down total
spending and analysing the specifics of expenditure provide a better analysis. Yet, that
should be a part of another study since the range of topics covered in this article is too large.
4. Power is a central concept in the analysis of peace and conflict. The variable, Composite
Index of National Capability (CINC), used here is an index variable that operationalises
power and is based on the annual values for total population, urban population, iron and
steel production, energy consumption, military personnel and military expenditure of a
given country.
5. Such a comparison involves only conventional forces and excludes Russia’s nuclear capa-
bilities and its unique nuclear power status in the Black Sea.
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